Introduction
The decreasing importance of manufacturing in many OECD countries, the parallel consolidation of services as the leading generator of employment and wealth, the successive economic crises that these economies have gone through since the 1970s, the competition in increasingly globalised product markets and the rise of atypical employment are some of the reasons why there has been much talk about trade union decline over the last three decades. In more recent times, though, there seems to have been a revival in the interest for collective action and trade unionism (Frege and Kelly 2003 and 2004) .
Collective bargaining and trade unionism are likely to remain concepts inextricably linked to the conflict between labour and capital, no matter how weakened traditional trade unionism appears to have become in recent decades. Industrial relations' institutions are the channels of this conflict (Korpi and Shalev 1979) . In this paper we explore how the institutionalisation of trade union activity at the national level is structured along different dimensions. Some of these dimensions have often been researched in the past but, to our knowledge, no systematic effort to disentangle them through quantitative research methods has been made so far.
After applying exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to data drawn from the CESifo database on 'Unions, Wage Bargaining and Labour Relations', we propose four different indexes of institutionalisation of trade union activity. By means of cluster analysis, we then assess the extent to which these four indexes allow a credible grouping of countries. Finally, we include the four indexes in a time-series crosssectional analysis of national strike rates. Besides the four indexes, the dataset includes data on a number of factors potentially affecting industrial conflict at the national level. The dataset covers 34 countries over a period from 1986 to 2007. We find robust evidence of a negative effect of unions' involvement in policy making over the level of industrial conflict; the other three dimensions of trade union activity do not turn out to have a statistically significant effect on national strike rates.
In the last section of the chapter we discuss possible, hypothetical reasons why other dimensions of trade union institutionalisation may not have the systematically depressing effect over strike rate that we initially expected. First, it may be that institutions are not just ways of channelling conflict (thus preventing that it becomes open) but also resources at hand of social actors (in this case, trade unions) in order to mobilise their supporters and affiliates precisely for waging open conflict . These two forces would eventually cancel each other. Moreover, it may happen that the role of institutions as resources and opportunities for open conflict are more relevant at the workplace level than at higher levels within the realm of industrial relations, since open conflict may have fewer adverse consequences for the trade union as a whole. This would explain that corporatism indeed has the expected depressing effect over strike rate, whereas other dimensions of institutionalisation of trade union activity have not.
Institutionalisation and conflict
Institutions have often been regarded as 'structures of cooperation' or collective action resolution (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Moe 2005: 215) . This view implicitly regards actors as equal in the amount of power they share within institutions.
1 Contrary to this 'contractarian perspective' (Korpi 2001), the 'power perspective' regards institutions as both representations of a given balance of power between opposing actors and ways of channelling the conflict between them. According to Jack Knight, an institution is 'not best explained as a Pareto-superior response to collective goals or benefits, but, rather, as a by-product of conflicts over distributional gains ' (Knight 1992: 19) . In the same vein, Walter Korpi sees institutions as 'structurations of power and residues of conflict '. (2001: 243) .
According to Korpi's power-resource theory, social actors have three major types of resources available: (a) violence, (b) economic resources,
